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Abstract  
We propose that foresight can contribute to inclusive development by making innovation 
systems more inclusive. Processes of developing future oriented innovation policies are often 
unsuccessful and rarely inclusive. We conceptualize such processes as foresighting. We focus 
on how the ex-ante design of policymaking processes affects the actual process with a focus 
on inclusion, and we discuss how it affects policy effectiveness and innovation system 
transformation. Our argument is that processes of policymaking must be inclusive to affect 
and transform innovation systems because a set of distributed actors, rather than ministries 
and innovation agencies, is the gatekeepers of change. From this perspective, inclusion is a 
precondition rather than an obstacle for transformation. Based on the notion of innovation 
system foresight, we develop an analytical framework that we use to study design and 
processes in foresight cases in two emerging economies: Brazil and South Korea. We 
conclude that better systemic and innovation oriented foresight is needed to enhance inclusive 
development. 
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1 Introduction 
From the perspective of evolutionary economics, learning and innovation are the most 
important processes in development (Nelson 2008). Including people in learning and 
innovation activities is thus a central part of inclusive development. The extent and direction 
of innovation activities are strongly influenced by a set of social structures that we often refer 
to as innovation systems. Making such systems more inclusive will thus promote inclusive 
development. We propose here that foresight may help us bring about more inclusive 
innovation systems. 
Ministries of finance, industry or science and technology in developing countries often 
produce ambitious plans and related innovation policies for strengthening and connecting 
science and technology (S&T) and industry activities to support innovation systems. Too 
often, such strategic initiatives fail. We suggest that one important explanatory factor behind 
failed policies can be found in the design of the very process of generating them. We argue 
that the extent to which the process of developing future oriented innovation policy
1
 is 
inclusive has important consequences for its likelihood of having an effect ex post. We 
conceptualize the process developing strategic innovation policy as foresight. Foresight is an 
important and widely used instrument for future oriented policymaking and for “wiring up” 
innovation systems (Martin & Johnston 1999).  
Foresight has over the recent decade or more implemented a more systemic and evolutionary 
understanding of innovation. In earlier work, we have suggested ‘innovation system foresight’ 
(ISF) as a tentative framework that can bring forward this development (Andersen & 
Andersen, 2014). ISF is a tool for strategically guiding innovation system (IS) transformations 
in desirable directions, e.g. towards more inclusivity. Nonetheless, such transformations are, 
we argue, feasible only if foresight design adheres to the basic ideas of ISF. These include a 
systemic understanding of innovation, which demands a focus on the particularities of the 
context wherein innovation takes place and relatively broad inclusion. Hence, our main 
proposition is that ISF can not only possibly ensure more inclusivity in innovation 
policymaking but also enhance the ‘effectiveness’ of it. From this perspective, inclusion is a 
precondition rather than an obstacle for transformation. To achieve transformations, 
                                                 
1 We refer to innovation policy in the “broad” sense (Lundvall & Borrás 2005). Furthermore, we use the terms 
“strategic” and “future-oriented” innovation policy interchangeably.   
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governments must build and institutionalize competences for inclusive public-private dialogue 
around innovation policy.  
The effect of inclusion in innovation activities on development outcomes is an emergent 
research area (Heeks et al. 2014; Johnson & Andersen 2012). The theme has hitherto largely 
been ignored in both innovation and development studies (Cozzens & Sutz 2014). Most 
empirical research on inclusion and innovation focuses on micro-level processes (for example, 
grassroots or frugal innovations), but the importance of broader system structures (i.e., 
institutions) wherein the latter processes are embedded is widely acknowledged (Andersen & 
Johnson, 2015; Cozzens & Sutz, 2014). In this paper, we focus on structural features of 
innovation policymaking. We thus contribute to the former knowledge gap by outlining how 
foresight can make innovation policy, and in turn innovation systems, more inclusive. More 
precisely, our argument is that the conceptual understanding of innovation and foresight that, 
embedded in foresight design, guides the process of innovation policymaking to a large extent 
determine whether its output (e.g. growth plan) can be implemented. The idea to combine 
foresight and innovation systems to study inclusive development is novel, and it emerges 
from the authors’ respective experience with innovation studies, technology foresight and 
development studies.  
Although most research concerns the inclusion of poor and vulnerable communities, a recent 
initiative from the OECD broadens the notion of inclusion to encompass social, industrial, and 
territorial inclusion into innovation systems (OECD 2013). A central point is that although 
aiding the poor remains at the core of inclusive development, we must acknowledge important 
interdependencies between the different forms of inclusion. For example, including poor 
people in labour markets depends on the growth of heterogeneous firms, and the workplace is 
often a key arena for learning. The inclusion of poor people into learning activities (as 
education) can help firms succeed via better equipped workers. Additionally, firms remain the 
key drivers of inclusive development and the main actors for up-scaling and diffusing 
inclusive innovations (specific products and services). We focus on industrial inclusion and 
thereby also contribute to research on inclusive development by exploring this novel concept 
empirically. 
The paper is both conceptually and empirically explorative. We propose that a certain type of 
foresight thinking —innovation system foresight—is particularly conducive to inclusive 
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development. Using interviews and secondary data sources, we present indicative evidence 
from case studies in Brazil and South Korea.  
Section 2 presents the conceptual linkages between foresight, inclusion and innovation system 
transformation. Section 3 presents our analytical framework and methods. Section 4 presents 
cases from Brazil and South Korea. Section 5 contains an analysis of the cases. Section 6 
discusses the findings and concludes the paper. 
2 Foresight, innovation systems and inclusion  
2.1 Inclusive and systemic policymaking  
It is widely recognized that neither a universal recipe for nor a general theory of policymaking 
for innovation exists (Ahlqvist et al. 2012). Nonetheless, policy and strategy development are 
increasingly being interpreted as a continuous, reflexive, distributed, and interactive learning 
process (Georghiou et al. 2008; Ahlqvist et al. 2012). Rodrik (2006, 2010) argues that in the 
global learning economy, there are no simple and universal paths to economic development. 
Therefore, any path is necessarily unclear ex ante, which makes systematic experimentation 
with policy and institutions the only sensible strategy.  
The systemic and distributed character of innovation has implications for inclusion in the 
policymaking processes. It has been recognized that the effectiveness—here understood as the 
implementation of policies, which is indicated by behavioural changes in actors—of policy 
depends to a large extent on the involvement of a broad range of actors in addition to those 
formally in charge. Due to the complexity of the learning economy, policy formulation relies 
on the knowledge, experience and competence of different stakeholders. Because 
policymakers cannot be understood as perfectly informed social planners, distributed 
policymaking via the inclusion of key stakeholders emerges as a necessary and integral part of 
innovation policy. Experience shows that involving key stakeholders and the public in 
dialogue and decision-making processes is essential to making socially robust solutions for 
new technology (Gibbons 1999; Mallett 2013).  
In this respect, policymaking is to a large extent about aligning expectations and building 
shared visions of the future that can enable the coordination of interdependent actors. Public 
policy thus plays a catalysing role in this perspective, which implies that the process of 
6 
 
formulating innovation policy and the benefits related to it (process benefits) might be more 
important than actual tangible outputs, such as reports, list of priorities and regulation 
(product outputs) (Ahlqvist et al. 2012). Hence, broad inclusion has a strong instrumental 
value for innovation policy, and policymaking needs to be both systemic and participatory.  
The direction of innovation policy development activities should not be understood as ‘blind’. 
It is directed by the dominant vision of the future—of what a desirable future would be—and 
resolving what are identified as problems in that optic. The influence of the perception of the 
future on the direction of learning and innovation is strong, whether it is explicit or implicit. It 
is not possible to rationally invest in a business, study for a career, save money or even send 
our children to school without making some assumptions about the shape of the future—it is 
thus inherent to decision making (Wehrmeyer et al. 2003). The process of policy 
experimentation should be guided by a deep understanding of current problems and by a 
systematic understanding of what the future might be.  
2.2 Foresight 
Foresight is often understood as a dynamic and systemic planning tool with participatory and 
inclusive elements. It is an activity that aims to build medium to long term visions, aimed at 
influencing present day decisions and mobilizing joint actions (Miles 2008). The purpose of 
foresight is thus to imagine different futures and their consequences and, on that basis, to 
engage in informed decision making. It is perceived as a process where new insights emerge 
and capabilities are built rather than a tool for prediction. Foresight thus rests on two key 
assumptions: (i) that the future is not laid out (ii) and that decisions made and actions taken 
today can affect the future. Foresight often functions as a knowledge input to formal 
innovation policymaking (e.g., legislation) that goes on in ministries and parliament. However, 
the effect of foresight on actual policymaking is debated (Costa et al. 2008; Havas et al. 2010). 
One of the key aspects for successful impact of foresight on policymaking is actually to create 
strong public–private partnerships during the foresight process as well as the integration of 
stakeholders into foresight programs (Calof & Smith 2010). In foresighting for inclusive 
development we put further emphasis on such inclusion of stakeholders.  
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2.3 Innovation system foresight 
Since the term was first suggested in the mid-1980s, foresight has been accepted as a field of 
practice in public policymaking (Irvine & Martin 1984; Martin 2010). Foresight has been 
characterized by increasing conceptual broadening and diversity that reflects experimentation 
with and application of diverse rationales as foundation for foresight. It has become more 
participatory and complex and is applied at multiple levels across numerous sectors (Miles 
2008).   
Amidst this growing diversity, the notion of innovation system foresight (ISF) was formulated. 
ISF serves to re-accentuate and further explore the conceptual commonalities of foresight and 
innovation systems thinking in a context where explicitly innovation oriented foresight 
approaches are few. Moreover, ISF is formulated partly in response to a lack of theoretical 
underpinnings and analytical coherency in the area of foresight research, and partly to 
accommodate the changing perception of innovation and innovation policy from a linear to an 
evolutionary systems perspective (Andersen & Andersen 2014). ISF is defined as a systemic, 
systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium  to long term vision-
building process aimed at present-day decisions and mobilizing joint actions with the purpose 
of transforming innovation systems in desirable directions, e.g. inclusivity or growth 
(Andersen & Andersen, 2014). In contrast to previous foresight approaches, ISF explicitly 
focuses on the nexus between foresight and innovation system research. We argue that the 
tenets of ISF make it a useful tool for making innovation systems more inclusive.  
A foresight can be described as consisting of three main phases: pre-foresight (design of 
foresight), foresighting (process of foresight) and post-foresight (implementation and 
dissemination of the outputs and outcomes of foresight), with each phase containing a number 
of steps, as seen from figure 1. In reality, the process is more iterative and contains several 
feedback loops, but for simplicity, these are not included in the illustration. ISF directly 
affects the pre-foresight phase, and due to interdependency between the phases, it indirectly 
affects the foresight and post-foresight phases. Below, we outline how ISF differs from 
foresight in general on four points (see more detail in Andersen & Andersen, 2014).  
(1) The goal of foresight. In the literature, several goals – or rationales – are mentioned such 
as setting priorities in S&T, guiding innovation systems, shop window for competences, 
enrolling new actors in the S&T debate, and network building (Barré & Keenan 2008; Miles 
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et al. 2008). However, we find that there exists a hierarchy among these goals. The primary 
goal of ISF is to ‘strengthen’ the innovation system in general. The aforementioned goals are 
seen as inputs to this primary goal. 
(2) System boundaries. There seems to be no agreed-upon method for setting system 
boundaries in foresight exercises and thus classifying factors as external or internal. Boundary 
setting influences the choice of methodology, data collection and stakeholder involvement in 
subsequent steps in the foresight process. ISF suggests following the definition of an 
innovation system as the organizing principle for setting boundaries. The system is then 
defined to include “the elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion 
and use of new and economically useful knowledge” (Lundvall 1992). This principle for 
boundary setting can, in turn, be used for different settings including sectors, technologies, 
regions, and nations. 
• 1. Goal of foresight
• 2. System definition 
• Motivation
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• Budget 
• Duration  
• Expected outcomes
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Figure 1: Phases and steps in foresight – based on Andersen and Rasmussen (2012) 
(3) Inclusion. Innovation system transformation requires distributed policy, which in turn 
requires (meaningful) participation of all key stakeholders. This point is closely related to 
system definition. A systems approach will tend to favour broad inclusion/participation 
because actors are seen as the primary agents, or gatekeepers, of change. Despite being in 
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principle a participatory policy instrument, the process of foresight can be more or less 
inclusive. Actually, so far, broader participation in foresight has been limited. Instead, the 
focus has been on expert groups. One can distinguish between narrow and broad foresight. 
Narrow foresight is based on a forecast tradition where only a few key experts are involved, 
whereas broad foresight includes a much wider set of stakeholders. Narrow foresight tends to 
assume that all new technology is beneficial and progressive, whereas broad foresight 
includes a discussion of the desirability, costs, benefits and direction of innovation (Loveridge 
2005). ISF is, in other words, inclusive foresight. There is a crucial link between inclusion and 
the implementation of foresight results in the post-foresight phase, which is essential for the 
usefulness of the exercise. In this sense, the initial system definition and the identification and 
enrolment of key stakeholders partly define implementation possibilities (Calof & Smith 
2010). It reflects a systemic interdependency between pre- and post-foresight because if those 
actors that are required to change behaviour have not been included, there is little chance that 
they will act in accordance with the formulated plans (Cagnin, 2011). In general, for policy 
interventions to be implementable in practice they must “crowd-in” the intrinsic motivations 
actors have such that they perceive them as supportive (Ostrom 2005).  
(4) Mapping the present. There is no widely agreed-upon method for analysing the present 
system situation. The quality of any foresight will depend on the quality of the mapping 
exercise because it will serve as a basis for the following foresighting steps. We suggest an 
innovation system framework for such analysis.   
2.4 Innovation system foresight and inclusive development   
There are many ways of defining inclusive development and so far no precise and broadly 
accepted definition of the term has emerged (Johnson & Andersen 2012). In this paper, we 
emphasize two aspects of inclusive development. First, one can distinguish between passive 
and active inclusion. Passive inclusion refers to initiatives to reduce inequality through 
redistribution of assets ex-post an economic process. While this can certainly contribute to 
balance out some inequalities, it is unlikely to address the factors producing inequality in the 
first place. Active inclusion requires that actors take part in shaping the processes of political, 
social and economic change (Sen 2000). We emphasize this latter perspective and understand 
inclusive development as the reduction of inequality in voice, influence, and participation of 
otherwise excluded (groups of) actors. In this perspective, the notions of “inclusion” and 
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“participation” in change processes are identical.2 Second, our focus is on inclusion in 
innovation and innovation policy processes. These are central but not sufficient for achieving 
inclusive development. Our attention to only one type of actors (firms) further limits our 
scope. We thus merely focus on one aspect of inclusive development. 
Foresight adhering to the tenets of ISF as outlined above can potentially promote 
inclusiveness in innovation systems through multiple channels: 
1. To manage, support and build interactive learning spaces. This involves supporting, 
reorienting and creating new networks and linkages within and across technologies, 
sectors and markets and around problem solving (Smits & Kuhlmann 2004). These 
interactive learning spaces can aid communication, understanding and collaboration 
across boundaries, be they geographical, organizational or disciplinary in nature, and 
thereby increase understanding and build trust between participants. Consequently, they 
can improve policy implementation through increased transparency, legitimacy and 
ownership. (Barré & Keenan 2008). 
2. Stimulating the identification, articulation and translation of the needs of the poor into 
demand for knowledge. This is an often overlooked but critical component of successful 
interactive learning and innovation (Laestadius 1998). Hence, there is a need for spaces 
that can facilitate these activities across subsystems.  
3. Capability building in participants and on a system level with a focus on enhancing 
responsiveness to change and on strategic thinking by developing language and practice 
for thinking about the future (Barré & Keenan 2008). 
4. Informing policy decision making processes, which concerns generating insights decision 
making regarding the dynamics of change, future challenges and options, along with new 
ideas, and transmitting them to policymakers (Costa et al. 2008). 
5. Facilitating policy implementation via inclusion, which enhances the capability for change 
within a given field by building a common awareness of the current situation and future 
challenges (Costa et al. 2008).  
6. Embedding participation in innovation policymaking. This corresponds to an 
institutionalization of ISF, which can facilitate the inclusion of civil society and industry 
                                                 
2 Hence, we use the terms interchangeably in this paper. 
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in the policymaking process, thereby improving its transparency, legitimacy and 
effectiveness (Costa et al. 2008). 
It is important to note that these benefits are exclusively ‘process benefits’ that are not 
possible with limited inclusion (narrow participation). Because policy must be distributed and 
actors are seen as the primary agents of change, innovation system foresight must be 
‘inclusive’ to be transformational. Moreover, ISF places particular emphasis on the micro 
foundations of the innovation system approach, which is interactive learning between users 
and producers (Johnson 2011). These actors require a shared vision to engage in successful 
interactive learning. Vision building can here be understood as bridging ‘distances’ (e.g. 
cognitive, cultural) between actors to ensure better communication. In this way, ISF can 
enhance the quality and quantity of couplings between actors in the economy, which 
augments the ‘effectiveness’ of innovation systems (Fagerberg et al. 2009). Additionally, ISF 
has the potential to strategically affect the direction of innovation activities through its 
function of vision building and influencing actors’ behaviour. This led Georghiou (2007) to 
argue that inclusive forms of foresight may not only make successful innovation more likely 
but also shape the direction of innovation towards solutions to problems related to grand 
societal challenges such as sustainability, poverty, or exclusion.  
3 Analytical framework and methods  
The main line of argumentation in this paper, which is illustrated in figure 2, is that to 
strategically include firms in learning and innovation, we must first include them in designing 
policies for innovation-led development. We suggest that one promising way of doing this is 
to further pursue the ideas embedded in ISF. However, inclusion is only one parameter in ISF. 
It is thus necessary but not sufficient for reorienting innovation systems. We operationalize 
the four points that distinguish ISF from foresight more generally. We propose that as the 
design of a foresight more strongly adheres to these points, its likelihood of succeeding in 
transformative change and development increases due to the process benefits accumulated. In 
the empirical analysis, we focus primarily on how foresight design affects the foresight 
process; see the dotted area at the bottom of figure 2. In the analysis, we thus compare how 
foresight design influences foresight processes in two cases and from that, we make tentative 
inferences about policy effectiveness. Our cases are embedded in a wider context that may 
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influence our phenomenon of interest. Although such influences are beyond the scope of our 
paper, we will be attentive to the issue. 
Figure 2: Degrees of ISF and innovation system transformation – analytical framework 
Eco
n
o
m
ic
o
u
tco
m
es
–
In
clu
sive
D
evelo
p
m
en
t
Impact on
Innovation
System: 
Direction
and extent
of change
P
o
licy «
Effectiven
ess»
Innovation Policy (IP) Process
Design of Foresight and IP-
making process
Goal
System definition
Inclusion
Mapping present
C
h
aracteristics
o
f Fo
resigh
t
an
d
 
IP
-m
akin
g
p
ro
ce
ss
Foresight Design inclusivity
– «rules of the game» 
Policy effectiveness
Inclusivity in innovation processes and 
economic outcomes
Process – degree of 
inclusivity
P
ro
cess
O
u
tp
u
t
(p
o
licy p
rescrip
tio
n
)
Causal link is primary focus of this paper
 
We analyse two cases of sector foresight from Brazil and South Korea, respectively. The 
countries were chosen for four reasons. First, both have extensive foresight activities and 
programmes targeting innovation and development. Second, both countries struggle to 
support innovation system transformation using foresight and innovation policy. Third, both 
are emerging economies that hold many lessons for other developing countries. Fourth, the 
foresight cases differ greatly between the countries, which make them interesting for 
comparison. In the following sections, we analyse and compare foresight practice in an 
organization (South Korea) and one foresight exercise (Brazil). We compare these rather 
different cases by focusing on the analytical dimension of foresight design i.e. extracting the 
how the conceptualization of foresight influences foresight design (planning), and the 
subsequent foresight processes. The empirical material draws extensively on a technical 
report by Andersen, Andersen, Park, & Cagnin (2014). 
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The case analysis will contain three main elements. First, we present a selective description of 
the innovation policy context. Second, we describe the foresight environment and earlier 
experiences. These descriptive parts presented in section four constitute the context wherein 
the individual foresight cases unfold. The third part of the analysis is to assess ISF content in 
the design of selected foresights and how this relates to the foresight process. Our foresight 
cases focus on the level of industrial sectors embedded in a wider national foresight culture. 
We focus on the period from approximately 1990 to 2010 where foresight activities for 
innovation policy took hold. Our data consist of academic publications, foresight reports and 
eight interviews with main actors in Brazil and South Korea conducted in June and July 2012. 
See Table 2 in appendix. In the following sections, we use numerous abbreviations. An 
overview of these can be found in table 3 in the appendix. 
4 Case descriptions 
4.1 Brazil  
 Policy for Innovation  
In the 1990s, initiatives on innovation policy were crowded out by strict macroeconomic 
policies. Governments abstained from proactive innovation policy which, instead, was left to 
the ‘market forces’. In this period, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) had 
marginal influence (Koeller & Cassiolato 2009). Innovation policy gradually returned during 
the 2000s, but competences for public-private dialogue on policy development had 
deteriorated. To restore industrial policy, resources allocated to innovation activities (both 
public and private) increased significantly.
3
 In this context, foresight was seen as a tool for 
restoring such dialogue. 
An important initiative was the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE) 
launched in 2004 by the Ministry for Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC). At the core 
of the PITCE was stimulating technological innovation and disseminating a pro-innovation 
discourse through the various ministries. This novel policy initiative lacked coordinating 
organizations and institutional support. Consequently, the government created the National 
Council for Industrial Development (CNDI) to support the formulation, implementation and 
                                                 
3 In 2000, Brazil invested approximately USD 8,327 million in ’scientific and technological activities’, which grew to 
USD 23,453.37 million by 2008 (1.43% of GDP) (RICYT, 2010). 
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monitoring of the PITCE. The CNDI aimed to give coherence to actions and proposals and to 
strengthen the dialogue between the public and the private sector on innovation policy. The 
Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI) was created as an executive secretariat 
for the CNDI. In addition to contributing to policy implementation and monitoring, ABDI 
also functions as a strategic think tank that interacts with industry via institutionalized 
channels of communication with most Brazilian industries in the form of competitiveness 
forums, trade chambers, sectoral chambers and working groups (MDIC 2010). ABDI 
articulates and diffuses the interests of industry in the CNDI. The mission of ABDI is to 
develop strategic plans for industrial development by promoting investment, employment, 
innovation and competitiveness in Brazilian industry (ABDI 2012). ABDI occasionally 
engages in foresighting with the participation of industry to develop such plans. It is part of a 
continuous dialogue that has generated trust between all actors (Filho & Cagnin 2012). 
 Foresight experiences 
The first explicit foresight (national) in Brazil was Brazil 2020 (1998), which was the first 
real attempt at ‘integrated governmental planning’. The foresight did not explicitly aim to 
produce guidelines and priorities for public investments, and it can best be understood as an 
early reflection exercise that has contributed to developing the capacity in Brazil for long-
term thinking (Santos & Filho 2007). The second foresight exercise was the Prospectar 
Programme (2000-2003), which was managed by the MCT, focused on science and 
technology trends and their potential effects on Brazilian industry and society. The 
programme achieved a remarkable mobilization of researchers (over 10,000), which helped 
raise awareness of Brazil’s future challenges and interest in long-term thinking. Problem 
identification and formulation was the main outcome (Popper & Medina 2008).  
Nearly simultaneously, the MDIC launched the Brazilian Technology Foresight Program 
(2000) with support from UNIDO. The motivation was to assess future challenges and 
opportunities of sectors (production chains) of strategic importance with the goal of 
contributing to industrial competitiveness through technological innovation supported by 
public policies (Santos & Filho 2007). Several reports were published from the exercise, but 
policymakers struggled to implement the results (MDIC 2002; Castro 2001). According to 
Aulicino & Kruglianskas (2008), this was because the underlying foresight processes did not 
include important industrial actors. They conclude that the pre-foresight process must be more 
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inclusive and involve the key stakeholders to improve their understanding of and participation 
in the process. In 2004, the Nucleus of Strategic Issues of the Presidency launched the 
foresight programme called Brazil 3 Moments project: 2007, 2015 and 2022. The programme 
aimed to define long-term national strategic objectives but was not particularly focused on 
innovation (Santos & Filho 2007; Popper & Medina 2008). It was created to build an 
inclusive dialogue between the State and the Brazilian society on the values, methods and 
desirable solutions for reaching strategic goals (Santos & Filho 2007). From these foresight 
activities has emerged the insight that broad inclusion is increasingly important for policy and 
strategy impact.  
 Foresight case description – Plano Estratégico Setorial  
In Brazil, we focus on a particularly interesting sectoral foresight programme called ‘Plano 
Estratégico Setorial’ (strategic sector plan – PES). It was managed in a collaboration between 
ABDI and the Center for Strategic Studies and Management in Science, Technology and 
Innovation (CGEE) between 2004 and 2008.  
PES was launched under PICTE to analyse and support sector-specific needs and 
competitiveness in a production chain perspective with a 15-year time horizon (ABDI 2012). 
PES contained three steps. First, a panorama analysis (description of the current situation) was 
performed for each sector. Second, on the basis of the trends, the issues and perspectives 
relevant to a segment of the sector were identified. Third, building on the first two steps, a 
sector competitiveness agenda (roadmap) was developed to support the formulation and 
implementation of public policies to strengthen competitiveness and innovation (Arcuri 2009). 
PES was partly initiated and managed by the ABDI. It resulted in 11 sectoral foresights for 
sector development strategies that were used as inputs to the discussions in the CNDI. These 
foresights were in turn used to formulate the Productive Development Policy programme 
launched in 2008, the aim of which was to improve long-term competitiveness. The foresights 
were used as inputs to discussions with the private sector. ABDI contracted CGEE to carry 
out the foresights in PES. 
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4.2 South Korea 
 Policy for Innovation  
OECD has recently argued that South Korea faces a challenge of moving from a ‘catching-up’ 
to a ‘creative’ innovation system. South Korea has reached the technological frontier in 
several sectors (particularly ICT) and must now increasingly stimulate innovative and creative 
technological development (OECD 2009). One challenge is that innovation policy is primarily 
focused on technology-push strategies rather than the diffusion of knowledge and interactions 
among actors (systemic policy). Additionally, the innovation system tends to overly favour 
the incumbent sectors of ICT and machinery manufacturing. Hence, the development model 
of South Korea is changing. Its approach to innovation policy must also change (Oh 2011).  
According to OECD, South Korea must develop a systematic and evolutionary approach to 
the promotion of innovation to support the dynamics and efficiency of innovation processes 
(2009). There is, in other words, a need for systemic policy tools for innovation  required for 
achieving system transformation, which hinges on distributed innovation policy and inclusive 
processes, as argued by OECD (2009: 185): “clearly, governments alone cannot implement 
national innovation systems; the form and functioning of the latter tend to depend upon the 
actions of and linkages between a constellation of actors, both public and private”. 
Nonetheless, innovation policy in South Korea is hierarchical and centralized (Schlossstein & 
Park 2006). Such top-down policy has been effective during the catching-up period but is now 
less suitable. Consequently, there is a growing need for inclusive innovation policy in South 
Korea. In this context, foresight at both national and sector levels has been an instrument for 
addressing the challenges outlined.    
 Foresight experiences 
In South Korea, foresight is central to innovation policy, which is predominantly managed in 
the form of laws and national plans that coordinate policies and allocate resources to STI. 
These traditional policy instruments have been complemented and informed by development 
of national visions and roadmaps (OECD 2009). One of the earliest initiatives for spurring 
this transformation was the formulation of ‘Vision 2025’ in 1999, which involved several far-
reaching proposals. As a part of realizing Vision 2025, the government launched the ‘Science 
and Technology Framework Law’ in 2001. It aims at promoting S&T more systematically by 
inter alia developing mid- and long-term strategies and implementation plans, improved rules 
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for inter-ministerial coordination, and broad support for R&D activities, S&T agencies and an 
innovation-driven culture. Moreover, based on the Framework Law, the government 
formulated the first ‘5-Year Science and Technology Plan’ and a ‘National Technology Road 
Map’, which were instruments for realizing Vision 2025. The first 5-year plan set out 
priorities for S&T investment, national R&D, and human resource development (MEST 2012). 
The law made it mandatory to carry out a national technological foresight as a basis for 
formulating the 5-year plans. The Korean Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and 
Planning (KISTEP) manages these foresights (Park & Son, 2010). Foresight is thus formally 
linked to innovation policy in South Korea (STEPI 2012). 
In terms of foresight design, South Korea found inspiration in Japan for its first foresight in 
1993. It was based on three rounds of Delphi surveys with thousands of experts. The focus 
was on identifying future key technologies without taking into account a social dimension. 
The second South Korean technology foresight was initiated in 1998. The design and 
methodology were similar to those of the first technology foresight (Schlossstein & Park 
2006). Schlossstein & Park (2006) conclude that these first two national technology foresights 
failed as a result of the exclusion of key stakeholders in the South Korean national system of 
innovation, and weak government commitment.  
The third South Korean technology foresight was initiated in 2003. It built on the previous 
two but also contained new methodological elements. It went beyond S&T and R&D priority 
setting and set out to match future societal needs and appropriate technological developments. 
Although the matching exercise was a novelty in South Korea, the Delphi technique remained 
the main tool. The foresight consisted of three phases, and the general public (1,000 persons) 
participated only briefly in the first phase. Thus, the exercise was dominated by experts that 
were asked about the future needs of society. The move towards a more ‘inclusive’ 
methodology made the foresight more transparent and useful for policymakers and resulted in 
the direct policy uptake of foresight results for the first time in South Korea (Schlossstein & 
Park 2006). According to Park & Son (2010), this third technology foresight reflects a 
movement, although limited, towards a systemic understanding of foresight and innovation 
due to the increased focus on social aspects and broader inclusion (policymakers, social 
scientists and citizens were involved, in comparison with earlier reliance on only natural 
scientists and engineers) that was intended to overcome the limited impact of the previous 
foresights (Park & Son 2010). In addition to the national technology foresights, ‘technology 
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road mapping’ is widespread in South Korea. It is the main form of foresight at the sector 
level in South Korea. Several private actors and think tanks use it as strategic and analytical 
tool. 
In general, foresight activities are confined to being exercises made within ministries with 
participation of academics and experts. This characteristic complicates impact and system 
transformation. Currently, the legacy of top-down policymaking and S&T bias in innovation 
policy are barriers for developing a systemic, inclusive and innovation-oriented type of 
foresight. The national technology foresights and most technology road mapping activities 
tend to be non-systemic, technology-focused, non-inclusive, hierarchical and centralized. In 
accordance, Park & Son (2006) argue that although there are variations in methodology, 
foresight activities in South Korea are oriented towards product outputs such as scenarios, 
Delphi survey results, and future technology lists, whereas attention to process outcomes such 
as building collective visions and strategies and sharing knowledge is low. 
 Foresight case description – Korean Institute for Advancement of 
Technology  
The main public policy foresight actors in South Korea are the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology (MEST) and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE). Each ministry has 
several affiliated research agencies that perform foresight activities to varying extents. The 
MKE’s mission is to achieve future-oriented industrial development, to strengthen the 
competitiveness of key industries, and to promote new growth engines (OECD 2009). These 
tasks involve strategy development and implementation, to which foresight is central. The 
MEST is concerned with setting priorities for the long-term direction of S&T development. 
Hence, whereas the MEST is oriented towards S&T (non-industry focus), MKE is closer to 
industry and more concerned with innovation. In practice, it implies that the MEST focuses 
on long-run S&T priorities, and MKE focuses on technology development in the short and 
medium run (KIAT 2012a).  
We focus on the MKE, under which two agencies, the Korea Institute for Advancement of 
Technology (KIAT) and the Korean Evaluation Institute of Industrial Technology (KEIT), 
manage the majority. Here, we focus on the KIAT, which is the main actor. Foresight in MKE 
primarily takes the form of technology road mapping, which is currently performed yearly for 
35 sectors, covering nearly all sectors in South Korea; of those, KIAT is responsible for 20 
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(KIAT 2012a). KIAT aims to develop and coordinate sectoral innovation systems and to 
facilitate interactive innovation processes among key actors (KIAT 2012b). The conceptual 
model used to manage foresight in KIAT has an explicit focus on technology development. 
The framework contains an analysis of the sector’s strategic environment (phase 1), an 
analysis of sector-internal issues (phase 2), setting goals on basis of SWOT analysis (phases 3 
and 4), and developing a strategy plan (phase 5) (KIAT, 2012c; Kim, 2012).  
5 Case analysis 
Despite the similarities of challenges faced in terms of foresight and innovation in the two 
countries, the case studies reveal some interesting differences. Table 1 summarizes the case 
studies and our assessment of them which we return to in the concluding section. 
Table 1: Summing up case studies 
  Plano Estratégico Setorial Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology 
Characteristic ISF 
“Score”* 
Characteristic ISF 
“Score”* 
G
o
a
l 
o
f 
fo
re
s
ig
h
t Effective industrial policy; 
transforming industrial system   
System transformation focus is 
important. It makes you identify 
actors as gatekeepers. 
  
(++) 
New industries and technologies by setting 
priority lists for investment in S&T rather than 
generating change 
This type of expert-based screening for 
future technologies must be seen as only 
one input to actual foresight and not end 
product 
  
(+) 
D
e
fi
n
in
g
 s
y
s
te
m
 Ad hoc and weak innovation focus 
but with systemic understanding 
of performance  
Illustrate that absence of explicit 
method for delimitating system of 
interest leads to ad hoc solutions 
  
(++) 
MKE decides sector boundaries via industry 
codes.  
Non-systemic understanding of performance 
and innovation 
Illustrate that absence of explicit method for 
delimitating system of interest leads to ad 
hoc solutions 
  
(+) 
In
c
lu
s
io
n
 
Broad inclusion 
Illustrate necessity of enrolling 
industry and how to do it (short- 
vs. long-term trade-off, trust) 
  
(+++) 
Narrow inclusion, expert-based Delphi 
700 experts organized yearly in expert 
groups. Nonetheless, top-down, expert-
driven and technology-focused method for 
strategy development without broader 
participation of stakeholders from the 
Innovation System. 
Shows necessity of enrolling industry though 
by negative example.  
  
(+) 
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M
a
p
p
in
g
 
Ad hoc design based on SWOT 
and STEEPV but with significant 
systemic features 
  
(++) 
Standard foresight instruments such as 
SWOT, STEEP, patents/scientific papers 
Ad hoc and S&T focused (linear 
understanding of innovation) 
  
(+) 
* The number of (+) indicates the degree of similarity with ISF; (+) weak, (++) moderate, (+++) strong 
5.1 Goal of foresight 
 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
The Plano Estratégico Setorial was intended to increase competitiveness, but more notably, 
ABDI and CGEE acknowledged the distributed character of industrial and innovation policy, 
particularly of strategy development for the longer term. This reflects the idea that industrial 
performance is a systemic phenomenon and that the success of (innovation) system 
transformation hinges on the acceptance from key stakeholders. From this perspective, top-
down policy is thus insufficient. Industrial actors must be enrolled in the strategy-
development process. PES thus goes beyond both setting research agendas and expert-based 
foresights to focus on realizing structural change via inclusive processes.  
 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
The goal of foresight activities in KIAT is derived from the overall visions of the MKE, 
which, as mentioned, pivots around the creation of new industries, competitiveness and 
productivity (KIAT 2012a). However, KIAT suffers from the institutional structure of being 
delivery agencies for MKE in the sense that neither of them is much concerned with pre-
foresight or post-foresight phases but merely performs the foresighting exercise. Their 
objectives are given by the MKE, which expects only a foresight report. This is an 
institutional weakness from the perspective of innovation system foresight. 
5.2 System boundaries 
 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
ABDI initially selected industries to be analysed. Each sector foresight had a steering 
committee with representatives from all stakeholders, including BNDES, MCT, FINEP, 
sectoral organizations (national level industry associations), CGEE, ABDI, and others. 
Committees decided guidelines and followed the process closely. Committees decided 
industry boundaries and who would be relevant actors to include (Campanhola 2012). In the 
pre-foresight phase, ABDI insisted on using private business consultants to avoid CGEE’s 
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usual reliance on only university researchers. Consultants would be more pragmatic and focus 
more on ‘market aspects’, it was believed (Campanhola 2012). ABDI wanted to reorient 
CGEE towards a more industrially inclusive approach to foresight. Thus, there was no 
systematic methodology or underlying theory for setting boundaries. Nonetheless, the 
negotiation process reflects that ABDI insisted on avoiding an (top-down) expert based 
foresight. 
 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
KIAT does not have an explicit methodology for setting sector boundaries (Kim 2012). MKE 
decides such boundaries, often via industry codes (KIAT 2012a). This type of boundary 
setting rarely captures all important actors and relationships because innovation systems per 
definition cross standard industry classifications (Carlsson et al. 2002). 
5.3 Inclusion  
 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
The identification and enrolment of actors to participate in foresights was a crucial aspect of 
the PES studies. ABDI carefully chose key stakeholders from each industrial sector to be part 
of the project. ABDI’s major goal was to persuade and to gain commitments from the 
committee representatives who could help organize the sector while improving its global 
competitiveness (Nehme et al., 2011: p. 5-6). The process was complicated, though. Firms 
insisted on solving short-term problems regarding interest rates and infrastructure and were 
not interested in or accustomed to long-term strategic thinking. ABDI succeeded due to a mix 
of factors.  
First, ABDI invested significant resources in gradually trying to convince them (and 
government officials) about the usefulness of foresight via training and workshops. Second, 
simultaneously with the foresights, ABDI launched a number of consultancy projects focusing 
on short-term problem solving for industries. Seen in the total budget of the PES, these short-
term investments were insignificant, but they reflected a compromise between short- and 
long-term issues. These projects were used as ‘bait’ for industry commitment and made 
industrial actors experienced that they had influence, which in turn earned ABDI and PES 
legitimacy (Alvarez 2012). 
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In addition, two context factors influenced the situation. First, ABDI was created to fill a 
vacuum in industrial policy in Brazil, and together with other policies (e.g., the PITCE), it 
reflects the determination in the government to pursue economic development through 
industrial policies that should pivot around science and technology. Industry perceived the 
latter as a business-friendly agenda and as a window of opportunity for actually influencing 
the political agenda (Alvarez 2012). Second, as a new organization, ABDI was determined 
and eager to prove itself by committing industry to programmes focusing on long-term policy 
and development strategies instead of indulging industry’s obsession with short-term 
problems (Alvarez 2012). Moreover, according to ABDI Director Clayton Campanhola 
(2012), ABDI had a ‘good name’, i.e., is an actor respected and trusted by industry.  
Hence, PES attained broad inclusion from industrial actors to facilitate industry 
transformation. Although it does not appear explicitly from our data, we may say that the 
design of PES had strong links between the pre-foresight and post-foresight phases. The 
ABDI/CNDI’s mandate ensured political awareness and the extensive inclusion of industry 
actors facilitated their cooperation.   
 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
The number of persons participating in the KIAT’s technology road mapping has been 
increasing. Now, approximately 700 experts participate in the 35 yearly mapping exercises. 
They are organized in expert groups consisting of approximately 20 persons each and come 
equally from universities, research organizations and industry (KIAT 2012a). However, 
according to Professor Karpsoo Kim, the increasing number does not change the fact that 
technology road mapping is generally a top-down method for strategy development, whereas 
foresight is a bottom-up method (Kim 2012). According to Kim, the KIAT’s technology road 
mapping is essentially expert-driven and technology-focused without any broader inclusion of 
stakeholders. 
5.4 Mapping the system 
 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
Mapping the system created challenges for CGEE because sectors differed significantly, 
forcing CGEE to develop its own sector foresight model (Filho & Cagnin 2012). It looks at 
each sector in six dimensions (general views) of society (Market, Social, Economic, 
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Technological, Innovation, Competitive Strategies). The external and general trends are 
combined with a sector-specific analysis, where the focus is put on new players, main 
competitor countries and leader companies in the production chain. The production chain 
analysis looks at talent, infrastructure, investments, policy and institutions, design, and other 
‘specific’ dimensions. It furthermore emphasizes the relationships between suppliers, 
producers and users in the chain as important for understanding needs (Nehme et al. 2011). 
The dimensions are chosen based on SWOT, STEEPV, or general experience. Although 
CGEE ad-hoc model is not linked to innovation system thinking, it reflects a systemic 
approach to both foresight and innovation. 
 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
There is no overarching theoretically anchored method for mapping the sectors (Kim 2012). 
The models illustrated apply standard foresight instruments such as SWOT, STEEP, patent 
analysis and value chain analysis. Moreover, a poor definition of system boundaries (section 
5.2.2) complicates the mapping task. Reliance on quantitative standard indicators further 
inhibits mapping of innovation system. 
6 Discussion and concluding remarks 
The Plano Estratégico Setorial and previous foresight activities in Brazil can be seen as 
attempts to develop systemic innovation policy tools and to institutionalize them. The main 
lesson from PES is that systemic and inclusive foresight design generates inclusive 
policymaking processes that, in turn, increase the likelihood of significant policy impact. The 
successful inclusion of industrial actors is an interesting feature of PES. It is a general 
challenge for foresight to achieve this. We can draw five lessons from PES on this topic.  
First, meaningful inclusion requires that industry representatives have knowledge of foresight 
and strategic innovation policy and consider it important, which implies training and dialogue. 
ABDI and CGEE organized training in the pre-foresight phase. Second, PES indicates that 
trust and dialogue between industry and government is a premise for enrolment and in turn 
meaningful participation. Industry must also be convinced that there is a real opportunity for 
influence. Third, a unique feature of PES was the management of trade-offs between short-
term problem solving and strategy development for the longer term. These three points all 
concern the inclusion of firms that initially wanted to be excluded. Fourth, during PES, CGEE 
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experienced that firms changed perception of the project from disbelief to engagement. Hence, 
included actors learned new things during the processes. Fifth, PES indicates that both the 
institutionalized dialogue that ABDI had with industries and the dialogue taking place during 
PES were very important for identifying and articulating the needs of industries and for 
building trust.  
PES was an experiment in identifying and formulating future needs for 11 industries. The 
companies alone would not have initiated such an experiment (Filho & Cagnin 2012). ABDI 
thus functioned as a ‘bridging organization’ (see Boon, Moors, Kuhlmann, & Smits, 2011) 
between industry, government and research. Such organizations seem indispensable when 
going beyond expert-based foresight. PES indicates that a continuous public-private dialogue 
about what constitutes current problems and a desirable future is a central part of managing 
innovation system transformation. On basis of our analysis, we evaluate the foresight design 
of PES to be reasonably similar to what we have identified as ISF; see table 1.  
The design of foresight in KIAT seems to be primarily top-down, expert based, not theory-
based, short term, product oriented, technology focused, and non-systemic. In this context, it 
is interesting to observe that KIAT identifies the poor diffusion of results, a weak industry 
impact, and the analysis of contextual factors as their main challenges. KIAT tries to diffuse 
results through hearings, meetings and engagement with industry, but the impact remains 
weak (KIAT 2012c; KIAT 2012a). Moving towards a systemic, inclusive and innovation-
oriented foresight style might alleviate the KIAT’s challenges. A potential barrier for directly 
including more diverse actors can be found in South Korea’s industrial structure. According 
to Sarpoo Kim, the multinational enterprises (Chaebols) are too strong to be bothered with 
what KIAT and MKE do, whereas the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are too 
weak to benefit from the results (Kim 2012). According to the KIAT, it is difficult to establish 
contact with industry, particularly SMEs. South Korea does not have capable industry 
associations (potential bridging organizations). Most of them have only 4-5 employees and 
are weak in terms of resources and capabilities (KIAT 2012a). In contrast to the PES case, 
there seems to be a lack of ‘bridging organizations’ such as ABDI and representatives for 
industrial actors that are able to proactively participate in foresights. The KIAT’s foresight 
design and associated policymaking processes are not very inclusive and are thus far from the 
ideas of ISF; see table 1. Hence, by negative example, the KIAT’s foresight activities suggest 
the same conclusion as PES, which is that foresight has potential as an inclusive and systemic 
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innovation policy tool. This potential is exploited only when foresight is designed according 
to the tenets of ISF. This is because foresight (and innovation policy, more generally) must be 
inclusive to be transformational, which implies that the actors in the system of innovation are 
the principal agents of change—the gatekeepers, so to say. 
This conclusion lends support to the broader propositions of this paper, i.e., including (often 
uninterested) firms in learning and innovation activities requires that they first be included in 
collective public-private strategy development processes leading to innovation and 
development strategies to feel ownership of policies, to have influence on them, and to 
understand and learn about them. Moving towards such practices in innovation policymaking 
is one way of making innovation systems more inclusive and thus to promote inclusive 
development. Accepting the argument implies that governments should invest in inclusive 
public-private dialogue about future oriented innovation and development policies guided by 
a systemic understanding of innovation. Moreover, governments should focus more on the 
process benefits of inclusion and support the formation of bridging organizations in industry. 
National investment priorities in innovation, which significantly affect the direction of 
innovation and thus the transformation of IS, are often selected in a relatively top-down 
manner. Its principal methodology is expert based working groups (with academic bias) and 
questionnaires surveying thousands of experts. The so-called linear model of innovation 
informs the underlying logic and perception of innovation, which is a problematic practice 
because we know that innovation is predominantly a systemic phenomenon. We have argued 
here that innovation system informed type of foresight can support better decision making in 
and the impact of such investments. This is particularly true in developing economies, where 
innovation systems are often fragmented (Szogs et al. 2011). Such countries are in need of 
systemic, forward looking and inclusive tools for ‘wiring up’ and transforming their 
embryonic systems of innovation. This paper constitutes a first tentative step towards finding 
a way forward. To build on and further explore this potential requires more conceptual work 
and empirical studies in developing countries. In terms of foresight techniques, we have kept 
to the simple dichotomy of inclusive, bottom-up versus non-inclusive, top-down categories. 
To move towards practical advice for foresight practitioners we need to start considering 
whether new techniques are needed to approach the insights of ISF. 
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Appendix 
Table 2: Overview of interviews 
Name  When (2012) Where 
Lèlio Fellows Filho 
Senior Foresight Manager and researcher 
 
Cristiano Cagnin 
Senior Foresight Manager and researcher 
June 4 CGEE, Brasilia 
Roberto Alvarez 
International Affairs Manager 
June 6 ABDI, Brasilia 
Clayton Campanhola 
Director (at the time) 
June 6 ABDI, Brasilia 
Byeongwon Park 
Future Strategy Team 
Research fellow 
 
Former Director 
Technology Foresight Center 
KISTEP  
 
July 10 STEPI, Seoul 
Karpsoo Kim,  
Professor, KAIST 
July 11 KAIST, Daejon 
Moonjung Choi 
Director of Technology Foresight Division 
Office of Future Strategy 
July 12 KISTEP, Seoul 
Ilgu Cho  
Technology Planning Team Leader 
July 13 KEIT, Daejon 
Yeong Cheol Seok 
Department of Technology Strategy 
KIAT Vice President 
 
Kee Nyeong Lee 
Technology Planning Team  
Team director 
July 16 KIAT, Seoul 
 
Table 3: List of abbreviations 
Abbreviation Full name Country 
30 
 
ABDI Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development  Brazil 
CGEE Center for Strategic Studies and Management in Science, Technology & 
Innovation 
Brazil 
CNDI National Council for Industrial Development  Brazil 
KAIST Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology South Korea 
KEIT Korean Evaluation Institute of Industrial Technology South Korea 
KIAT Korea Institute for Advancement of Technology South Korea 
KISTEP Korean Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and Planning  South Korea 
MCT Ministry of Science and Technology  Brazil 
MDIC Ministry for Development, Industry and Trade Brazil 
MEST Ministry of Education, Science and Technology South Korea 
MKE Ministry of Knowledge Economy South Korea 
PES Plano Estratégico Setorial’ (strategic sector plan) Brazil 
PITCE Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy  Brazil 
STEPI Science and Technology Policy Institute South Korea 
 
